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COMMENT
REVIEW OF "JURISDICTIONAL" ISSUES
UNDER THE BUMPERS AMENDMENT
RONALD M. LEVIN*
The proposed Bumpers Amendment to the Administrative Proce-
dure Act would encourage courts to be less deferential than they have
previously been towardfederal agencies' views on issues of law. With
regard to '.irisdictional" questions, the amendment would go further:
it would invite courts not only to assert their independence, but also to
disfavor agencies'positions. Professor Levin regards this special rule of
construction forjunsdictional questions as an attempt to achieve dereg-
ulation through judicial review. He criticizes this strategy as poorly
conceived and calls attention to several weaknesses in the draftsmanshp
of the jurisdiction provision.
The past few years may well be remembered as a time when con-
cern about "overregulation" and enthusiasm for "deregulation"
reached a high-water mark in public discourse and political rhetoric.
Two recent manifestations of the deregulation movement' are the regu-
latory reform bills, S. 10802 and H.R. 746,3 that almost passed in the
Ninety-Seventh Congress 4 Both bills contained a version of the
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington University.
The author served from 1979 to 1981 as consultant on the Bumpers Amendment to the
Administrative Conference of the United States, and some of the preliminary work for this
comment was used in the preparation of the Conference's recent statement opposing the
amendment. See Current Versions of the Bumpers Amendment (Recommendations of the Ad.
Conf. of the United States), 1 C.F.R. §305.81-2 (1982). The comment itself, however, has not been
presented to the Conference and expresses only the author's views.
1. For a survey of the ways in which the regulatory reform movement has come to repre-
sent, in part, a drive for deregulation, see Strauss, Regulatory Reform in a Tnme of Transition, 15
SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 903, 910-11, 921-32 (1981).
2. S. 1080, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (as amended), 128 CoNo. REc. S2713 (daily ed. Mar. 24,
1982).
3. H.R. 746,97th Cong., 2d Sess. (as amended), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 435,97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 HousE REPORT].
4. When Congress adjourned, the Senate had passed S. 1080 by a vote of 94-0, and H.R. 746
had been reported out of the House Judiciary Committee. During the fall of 1982, negotiations
between representatives of the Business Roundtable and of Speaker of the House Thomas P.
O'Neill led to a comprehensive compromise proposal to amend H.R. 746. See ANrrmusr &
TRADE REo. REP. (BNA) No. 1082, at 521 (Sept. 23, 1982); Legal Times of Wash., Sept. 20,1982,
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Bumpers Amendment, a proposal to amend section 706 of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA), which governs the scope of judicial re-
view.5 As this comment will demonstrate, an awareness of Congress'
desire for deregulation is indispensable to understanding the meaning
and purpose of at least one provision of the Bumpers Amendment.
The S. 1080 version of the Bumpers Amendment would make four
substantive6 changes in section 706. First, it would add the word "in-
dependently" to the opening sentence of the section, instructing review-
ing courts that they should "independently decide all relevant
questions of law.' 7 Second, the amendment would require the agency
to provide "substantial support in the rule making file" for fact findings
in informal rulemaking proceedings." Two new sentences that would
become subsection (c) of section 706 constitute the third and fourth
changes. They read as follows: .
at 4, col 1. (For the text of the O'Neill compromise bill, see Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA), Sept.
17, 1982, at B-I.) The House Rules Committee prevented this measure from reaching the floor
during the lame-duck session of Congress in December. ANTrrRusT & TRADE Ro. REP. (BNA)
No. 1095, at 1125 (Dec. 23, 1982).
The O'Neill bill has been reintroduced this year as H.R. 220,98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG.
REc. H45 (daffy ed. Jan. 3, 1983). The Senate's current regulatory reform bill is identical in
number and wording to the bill it passed last year. See S. 1080, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONo.
REc. S4909 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1983).
5. Section 706 now reads as follows:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing
court shall -
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law;,
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory
right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;,
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of
this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute;
or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo
by the reviewing court. In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of
the rule of prejudicial error.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
6. In addition, the amendment would designate as subsection (b) the last sentence of ex-
isting section 706; the preceding text would become section 706(a).
7. 128 CONG. RFc. S2717 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1982).
8. This provision, which would become clause (d) of section 706, reads as follows: "In mak-
ing a finding under subsection (a)(2XA) of this section, the court shall determine whether the
factual basis of a rule adopted in a proceeding subject to section 553 of this title is without sub-
stantial support in the rule making file." Zd at S2718.
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In making determinations concerning statutory jurisdiction or au-
thority under subsection (a)(2)(C) of this section, the court shall re-
quire that action by the agency is within the scope of the agency
jurisdiction or authority on the basis of the language of the statute or,
in the event of ambiguity, other evidence of ascertainable legislative
intent. In making determinations on other questions of law, the
court shall not accord any presumption in favor of or against agency
action, but in reaching its independent judgment concerning an
agency's interpretation of a statutory provision, the court shall give
the agency interpretation such weight as it warrants, taking into ac-
count the discretionary authority provided to the agency by law.9
Subsection (c) aims to provide guidance to the courts as they resolve
"questions of law." Issues of "jurisdiction or authority" (a vague term
presumably denoting certain statutory issues that are deemed especially
fundamental or critical' 0) would be governed by the first sentence, and
"other" issues of law by the second. In this comment, the first section
of section 706(c) will be called the "jurisdiction" provision; the second
sentence will be called the "no-presumption" provision.
The academic literature contains a fair amount of commentary on
the concepts underlying the addition of "independently," the "no-pre-
sumption" provision, and the "substantial support" provision.'" In
contrast, the Bumpers Amendment's special standard of review for ju-
risdictional issues has remained largely unexplored.' 2 It deserves more;
9. Id Subsection (a)(2)(C), mentioned in the first sentence of section 706(c), corresponds to
section 706(2)(C) of the present APA. See supra note 6.
10. For analysis of the meaning of the term 'jurisdiction or authority," see infra notes 76-106
and accompanying text.
11. For comment on the addition of "independently" and the no-presumption provision, see,
e.g., Proceedings of the Forty-first Annual Judicial Conference for the District of Columbia Circuit,
89 F.R.D. 169 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Proceedings]; Levin, Judicial Review and the Bumpers
Amendment, 1979 RECOMMENDATIONS & Rmps. oF THE AD. CONF. OF THE UNrrED STATES 565
(1981); Kennedy, The Bumpers Amendment: Regulating the Regulators, 67 A.B.A.J. 1639 (1981);
McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 CoLuM. L. Rnv. 1119, 1162-68
(1977); Pierce & Shapiro, Political and Judcial Review of Agency Action, 59 TEx. L. Rnv. 1175,
1189-95 (1981); Woodward & Levin, In Dfense of Deferenc" JudicialReview ofAgencyAction, 31
AD. L. REv. 329 (1979). A forthcoming article by the author will deal with issues raised by these
provisions.
The "substantial support" clause reflects a decade of controversy over the appropriate scope
of review of agency fact findings. See, eg., DeLong, Informal Rlemaking and the Integration of
Law and Policy, 65 VA. L. REy. 257 (1979); Gifford, Rulemaking andRulemaking Review: Strug-
gling Towarda New Paradigm, 32 AD. L. REv. 577 (1980); Pedersen, FormalRecords andInformal
Rulemaking, 85 YALE LJ. 38 (1975); Verkuil, Juaidia Review ofInformalRulemaking, 60 VA. L.
REV. 185 (1974).
12. But see O'Reilly, Deference Makes a Difference. A Study of Impacts of the Bumpers Jud-
cial Review Amendment, 49 U. CIN. L. REv. 739, 773-76 (1980); May, Some Preliminary Observa-
tions on the Effect the Bumpers Amendment Would Have on the Federal Communications
Commission, 27 Fi.. B. NEws 165 (1980). O'Reilly also analyzes the other changes effected by the
Amendment_ O'Reilly, supra, at 768-73, 776-78.
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in some ways it is the most original and intriguing part of the proposal.
In particular, the jurisdiction provision is notable because it seems to
embody a substantive point of view: it is intended to convey to the
courts a distinct preference for relatively narrow constrution of regula-
tory statutes. In effect, it constitutes a congressional effort to achieve a
mild degree of deregulation through judicial review. This comment
outlines the development of the jurisdiction provision, explores some of
its ambiguities, and considers whether, on balance, it is likely to make a
constructive contribution to judicial review of agency action.13
I. THE MEANING OF THE PROVISION
On the surface, the jurisdiction provision is puzzling. It instructs
courts to resolve issues of statutory jurisdiction using the language of
the statute and other evidence of legislative intent. Yet courts have
always purported to do this. The literal meaning of the provision is so
banal that one can hardly believe it fully expresses the message that the
supporters of the amendment want to convey. To make sense of this
seemingly insignificant provision, it will be necessary to examine the
legislative history of the amendment and then to juxtapose the jurisdic-
tion provision with the other provisions of the amendment.
A. A Bief Tour of the Legislative History.14
In 1975 Senator Dale L. Bumpers, a Democrat from Arkansas, in-
troduced a bill that would have directed courts reviewing administra-
tive action to decide all questions of law "de novo" and to forswear any
"presumption of validity" associated with rules and regulations.' 5 The
Senate ignored the bill for several years. In September 1979, however,
13. As passed by the Senate, S. 1080 contained only one of several versions of the Bumpers
Amendment that circulated through the Ninety-Seventh Congress. The S. 1080 version was a
compromise between the approaches favored by the Senate Judiciary and Government Affairs
Committees. See Lyra note 39. The House Judiciary Committee version, supra note 3, would
have entirely eliminated the "no-presumption" sentence of section 706(c). But in the O'Neill-
Business Roundtable compromise, see .upra note 4, which was subsequently submitted to the
House, section 706(c) appeared in much the same form as in S. 1080. (In the O'Neill version, the
two sentences appeared in opposite order from the Senate version, and the jurisdiction provision
did not refer to issues of 'jurisdiction or authority" but only to issues of 'jurisdictione') Minor
variations in the "substantial support" provision also appeared in these competing drafts.
This comment examines the S. 1080 wording of section 706(c) because that version was the
result of a compromise between the two major contending forces, Senator Bumpers and the White
House. See Jyla note 39. The adoption of very similar language by the representatives of
Speaker O'Neill suggests that the House would have found the Senate's ultimate version of section
706(c) acceptable.
14. The events summarized in the next few paragraphs are reviewed at length in O'Reilly,
ispra note 12, at 747-67.
15. S. 2408, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., 121 CoNo. REc. 29,956 (1975).
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shortly after the American Bar Association had unexpectedly endorsed
the bill, Senator Bumpers was emboldened to offer his proposal as a
floor amendment to an unrelated bill. Apparently persuaded by his
denunciations of the foibles of the bureaucracy, 16 the Senate accepted
the amendment on a 51-27 vote.17 Agencies and their supporters were
stunned and began a strong campaign to stop the amendment's pro-
gress toward enactment. Business groups were delighted that the an-
tiregulatory movement had displayed such strength, but at the same
time they were concerned that the amendment might be overbroad and
simplistic. As a result, friends of the amendment formed an alliance
with the Senator for the purpose of revising the proposal to ensure its
success. 18
During the meetings of this alliance, the idea of giving special sta-
tus to issues of jurisdiction first emerged. A memorandum prepared by
the ABA and the Business Roundtable as a basis for negotiations 9 "ex-
plained" the amendment as directing courts to resolve "questions as to
the agency's interpretation or application of the substantive law it has
jurisdiction to administer" and "questions of procedure" by "using
their own best judgment, without a built-in bias either for or against
the government." 20 For "questions as to the agency's jurisdiction," a
different principle would operate: "courts... should apply a rule of
strict or narrow construction where the agency's action has been chal-
lenged as outside the scope of its authority or as contrary to express
statutory limitations on its authority."2' Senator Bumpers promptly
embraced the ABA-Business Roundtable position, claiming that it was
what he had meant all along: "My intent was to allow the court to use
its own judgment on whether or not to defer to agency expertise on
[most] legal questions but not to allow any deference in the case of
jurisdictional legal questions." 22 The proponents had thus articulated
their purposes in two ways that are still useful for an understanding of
the jurisdiction provision of the amendment: courts should construe
jurisdictional boundaries strictly against agencies, and. they should ac-
16. See 125 CONG. REc. 23,479-81 (1979).
17. Id at 23,499. This vote was on a motion to table; when the motion failed, the opponents
acquiesced and allowed a voice vote approval of the amendment. See id at 23,504.
18. See O'Reilly, supra note 12, at 758-59.
19. Regulation Reform Act of 1979: Hearings on HRA 3263 Bfore the Subcommr on Adminir-
trative Law and Gov't Relations of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess.
1101-08 (1979-80) [hereinafter cited as 1979-80 Hous HEARINros].
20. Id at 1103.
21. Id; see also id at 1080 (testimony of Richard D. Wood, Business Roundtable) ("agency's
authority must be spelled out in its organic statute directly or by clear implication"), 1089 (amend-
ment should "establish a rule of 'clear statement' or strict construction").
22. Id at 746 (testimony of Senator Bumpers).
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complish this by refusing to give weight to the agency's view of where
those boundaries He.
Events of 1980 reveal that the alliance's views were widely shared
and that various parties were engaged in a search for the right way to
cast those views into suitable statutory language. The Senate Judiciary
Committee adopted a version of the amendment calling for reviewing
courts to "require that the agency's statutory jurisdiction or authority
has been granted expressly or, in light of the statute and other relevant
materials, by clear implication."23 The White House proposed a stan-
dard that would uphold jurisdiction findings that were "consistent with
ascertainable legislative intent."' 2 The Senate Government Affairs
Committee staff thought that a "reasonable implication" drawn from
the legislative materials should be sufficient support.7- These negotia-
tions culminated in September 1980, when Senator Bumpers and the
ABA-Business Roundtable representatives arrived at a version of the
amendment that they felt was at least somewhat responsive to White
House and agency concerns. The House Judiciary Committee adopted
their formulation in its principal regulatory reform bill, H.R. 3263.26
The negotiators' compromise specified that "the court shall require
that action by the agency [be] within the scope of the agency jurisdic-
tion or authority on the basis of the language of the statute or, in the
event of ambiguity, other evidence of ascertainable legislative intent. '27
This phrasing has remained substantially unchanged in all subsequent
drafts of the amendment. In view of the preceding versions of the bill,
one can readily understand the point that the jurisdiction provision
makes (however obliquely the text expresses it): somehow, the court
must insist that an agency action have a greater degree of support in
statutory language or other legislative materials than has heretofore
been required.
The legislative history materials prepared in the House to accom-
pany H.R. 3263 cast further light on the purposes of the jurisdiction
23. S. 262, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. §216 (as amended), quoted in S. REP. No. 1018 (pL 2), 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 157 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT]. The Judiciary
Committee wrote:
The need for such an independent check on an agency's assertion of its own authority or
jurisdiction has long been a mainstay of administrative law... As Congress continues
to delegate broad grants of authority to agencies, the Committee believes that there is
increasing need for vigilant scrutiny of the limits of that authority.
Id at 66.
24. O'Reilly, supra note 12, at 763.
25. Id at 775.
26. H.R. 3263, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. §207 (1980) (as amended), reprinted in H.R. REP. No.




provision. A statement filed by Representative Synar declared that the
bill would direct courts to "play a more active role in policing legisla-
tive delegations of power by closely construing statutes which transfer
regulatory authority to administrators. ' 28 Courts would "take a hard
look at assertions of regulatory jurisdiction or authority."29 Represen-
tative Synar's statement has special significance because it was drafted
in cooperation with Senator Bumpers and his allies, and was evidently
meant to be an authoritative explication of the amendment.30 Repre-
sentative McClory, who joined Synar in sponsoring the revised amend-
ment within the Committee, described the court's task as "tak[ing] a
scrutinous look at whether or not the agency has acted within its spe-
cific statutory authority." 31
In 1981 and 1982 the Senate and House committees handling the
regulatory reform bills made no revisions in the language of the juris-
diction provision, but they did generate fresh legislative history inter-
preting it. In addition to repeating the language of the Bumpers-Synar
statement, quoted above, 32 the Senate Judiciary Committee report
commented:
[A]n extension of an agency's jurisdiction or authority beyond that
expressed in the language of the statute must be based on facts or
materials in the statute's legislative history that can be discerned,
identified, and discussed by the reviewing court....
... [U]nder this amendment, a reviewing court could not prop-
erly uphold an extension of agency authority. . . on the ground that
the extension "is reasonable and is not prohibited by the statute" or
that the extension "is reasonable and is consistent with the statute."
Subsection (c)'s requirement of affirmative evidence is not met by an
absence of contradictory evidence. Reasonableness and consistency
28. 1980 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 26, at 124.
29. Id at 125.
30. Senator Bumpers introduced the same statement into the Congressional Record a few
days later and has continued to refer to it as the primary expression of legislative intent regarding
the compromise amendment. See Regulatory ProceduresAct of 1981: Hearings on H.R 746 Before
the Subcom. on Administrative Law and Govtal Relations of the House Comm on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., Ist Sess. 60, 919 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 HousE HEAINOS]; 127 CONG. REC.
S4239 (daily ed. April 30, 1981); 127 CONo. REc. Sl12 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981); 126 CONG. REC.
S13,879 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980).
31. 1980 HousE REPORT, suara note 26, at 110. McClory also noted: "Courts are directed to
make an independent determination as to whether or not an agency's action is based upon power
expressly granted in the relevant statute or may be readily ascertained from the legislative intent."
Id Although McClory did not explicitly limit this remark to jurisdictional issues, his emphasis on
"expressly granted... or readily ascertained" statutory authority suggests that he had the juris-
diction provision of the amendment in mind.
32. S. REP. No. 284, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 169 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 SENATE JUDI-
CiARY REPORT]; see aso S. REP. No. 305, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981
SENATE GOV'T AFARs REPORT] (similar).
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with the statutory purpose are not the equivalent of evidence of as-
certainable legislative intent.33
The House Judiciary Committee's report seems generally in accord:
This provision is intended to assure that the courts determine
the limits of an agency's power to act solely by reference to legitimate
indicia of congressional intent. This requirement will foreclose reli-
ance upon the agency's interpretation or a practice concerning the
limits of its power to act, unless the legislative history indicates that
Congress intended to embrace that interpretation or practice. 34
B. The Provision in the Context of the Entire Amendment.
As the preceding account shows, the drafters of the amendment
have promoted the jurisdiction provision as a means of inducing courts
to require an agency to produce stronger justifications for its actions
than some courts have demanded in the past. Yet, to a considerable
extent, this description of the intent of the provision would apply just as
well to the other sections of the amendment dealing with review of "le-
gal" questions. A brief examination of these other sections will permit
a more precise statement of the role that the drafters intended the juris-
diction provision to play.
The other proposed changes in section 706 that deal with questions
of law can be traced back to the original Bumpers Amendment. 35 The
addition of the word "independently" to the APA's mandate that
courts should "decide all relevant questions of law" is intended, the
committee reports say, to "reemphasize the primary role of the courts
in interpreting all sources of law."36 The second sentence of section
706(c) is basically an elaboration of this theme of judicial neutrality. In
mandating that a court may not "presume" that an agency's view on a
nonjurisdictional legal issue is correct, the second sentence is "designed
to ensure that, as to questions of law, the agency and those seeking
review stand on equal footing before the court without bias, preference,
or deference to either .... ,,37
The ultimate Senate version of the second sentence spells out the
role that the amendment envisions for administrative interpretations in
the court's "independent" decisionmaking: the court shall "give the
33. 1981 SENATE JUDICtAY REPORT, spra note 32, at 169.
34. 1982 HOUSE REPORT, spra note 3, at 74; see also Id at 75 (court must determine whether
Congress conferred the asserted power "either expressly or by reasonable implication").
35. See mupra text accompanying note 15.
36. 1981 SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 32 at 165; see 1980 HousE REPORT, supra
note 26, at 124 (Bumpers - Synar statement) (similar); see also I at 53 (report of Committee
majority) (courts "should take an independent look at the legal issues presented for review, and
reach their own judgment regarding them"); 1982 HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 73 (same).
37. 1981 SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 32, at 170;, accord, 1980 HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 26, at 126 (Bumpers - Synar statement).
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agency interpretation such weight as it warrants, taking into account
the discretionary authority provided to the agency by law."38 This lan-
guage was added very late in the negotiation process, 39 but it seems to
be merely a clarification of what the committee reports had said ear-
lier.40 The amendment thus recognizes the traditional view that an
agency's legal position can often be persuasive as to the position the
court should adopt-for example, if it has been followed consistently
by the agency for many years,41 if it is an outgrowth of the agency's
practical experience in implementing the statute,42 if affected persons
have relied on it,4 3 or if Congress has signaled acceptance of it.44
Taken as a whole, the no-presumption sentence of section 706(c) adopts
a moderate and appropriate stance: agencies' views on legal questions
are frequently instructive, but courts bear responsibility for the correct-
ness of the ultimate decision. 45
38. See rupra text accompanying note 9.
39. The Senate Judiciary and Governmental Affairs Committees reported out contrasting
versions of the amendment in 1981. The Judiciary version of section 706(c) was like the ultimate
S. 1080 version, but lacked the language beginning with "but"; the Government Affairs Commit-
tee proposed deleting the second sentence entirely. The ultimate wording then emerged from
negotiations between Vice President Bush (representing the White House) and Senator Bumpers.
It was added to S. 1080 by consensus. See 128 CoNG. REc. S2406 (daily ed. March 18, 1982)
(remarks of Senator Bumpers).
40. The no-presumption rule of section 706(c) "does not mean that a court cannot, on the
basis of its careful evaluation of the statute and the circumstances of a case, give weight to an
agency's interpretation of its authorizing legislation." 1980 HousE REPORT, supra note 26, at 54.
Instead, such an interpretation "will be one element of the process of independent judicial reex-
amination." Id at 126 (Bumpers - Synar statement); 1981 SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, suipra note
32, at 170-71.
41. See, ag., Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981); EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp.,
449 U.S. 590, 600 n.17 (1981).
42. See, eg., NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344,349 (1953), cited with approvalin
1980 HousE REPORT, supra note 26, at 54.
43. See, eg., National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 485-86 (1979)
(dicta); Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
44. See, ag., United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 & n.10 (1979).
According to Justice Jackson's well-known dictum, the weight accorded to a particular
agency interpretation should depend on "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the valid-
ity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to controL" Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944). This formula has been cited with approval by the amendment's proponents. See
1981 SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 32, at 171; 1980 HousE R.PORT, supra note 26, at
127 (Bumpers - Synar statement).
45. In my view (which will be elaborated in a subsequent article), what makes the "no-pre-
sumption" sentence of S. 1080 tolerable in its final version is that it deals only with "questions of
law." Such questions are contrasted in the legislative history with questions of "fact or policy."
See, eg., 128 CoNo. REc. S2406 (daily ed. March 18, 1982) (statement of legislative intent by
Senator Bumpers and Vice President Bush); 1981 SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 32, at
171; 1981 HOUSE HEARuNos, supra note 30, at 919 (testimony of Senator Bumpers). Thus, the
abolition of a presumption of validity applies only to issues that the court has determined-
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Assuming that the second sentence properly recognizes that courts
speak with primary authority on legal issues in general, it is not imme-
diately clear how a court can be expected to apply a different standard
of review to jurisdictional legal issues. The legislative history asserts
that the jurisdiction provision will cause courts to take a "hard look" at
agency assertions about their powers." Yet it is difficult to understand
how any look could be "harder" than the scrutiny prescribed for nonju-
risdictional issues, whereby the court must act "independently" and
consider agency views only for their persuasive value. Thus, to the ex-
tent the jurisdiction provision simply enjoins courts to be careful, criti-
cal, or diligent in their work, it adds nothing. The second sentence
recognizes "deference" only by saying that an agency's view should be
granted "such weight as it warrants"; the first sentence seems peculiar
indeed if it is meant to suggest that the courts, when resolving jurisdic-
tional issues, should not give agency views the weight they "warrant."
Nevertheless, if section 706(c) is to make even minimal sense, the two
sentences must somehow be read as prescribing different standards of
review.
The amendment's dual standard47 becomes explainable if the ju-
risdiction provision is interpreted as containing a substantive message.
So read, the provision would require that grants ofjurisdiction to agen-
cies-like penal statutes, 48 antitrust immunities, 49 and Freedom of In-
formation Act exemptionsSo-be narrowly construed.5' To be sure, the
through pre-existing modes of analysis that the amendment does not purport to regulate--to be of
a type !hat may appropriately be placed primarily in judicial hands.
46. See supra note 23; text accompanying notes 29, 31-32; see also 1981 House HEARINGS,
supra note 30, at 925 (testimony of Senator Bumpers); Proceedings, supra note 11, at 200 (remarks
of Stephen Breyer).
47. The Senate Government Affairs Committee and the House Judiciary Committee voted to
delete the second sentence of section 706(c); thus, one might argue, they did not actually endorse a
double standard. The House Judiciary Committee did, however, favor the provision instructing
courts that they should "independently decide all relevant questions of law." Moreover, the Gov-
ernment Affairs Committee's position on this point was displaced by the restoration of the second
sentence on the Senate floor, and there is an excellent chance that the full House would have
followed the Senate's lead. See supra note 13.
48. See, ag., United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293 (1971).
49. See, eg., Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
50. See, eg., Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
51. Some passages in the legislative history describe the jurisdiction provision as creating a
principle of statutory construction, see supra note 21 and accompanying text; others describe it as
imposing a "burden of persuasion [on] the person asserting that agency jurisdiction exists." 1981
SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, jupra note 32, at 170;, see 1980 House REPORT, supra note 26, at 126
(Bumper - Synar statement); 1979-80 HousE HEARINGS, supra note 19, at 746 (testimony of Sena-
tor Bumpers). The latter characterization is controversial, because other authoritative legislative
history sources flatly assert that the amendment does not shift any burden of proof, 1980 House
REPORT, supra note 26, at 55 (report of Committee majority); 127 CONG. REc. S4234 (daily ed.
Aprl 30, 1981) (remarks of Senator Laxalt), and, more specifically, that under the jurisdiction
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step is meant to be a small one; the legislative history contains numer-
ous assurances that no drastic break with the past is contemplated 52
and that courts remain free to use all traditional canons of construc-
tion.5 3 It is difficult to escape the conclusion, however, that the amend-
ment is intended to launch a new principle of construction, under
which courts are expected to "lean" slightly toward deregulation.
The legislative history suggests two possible ways in which this
principle of construction may be translated into practical terms. First,
recall the reports' emphasis on the need for "affirmative evidence" of
congressional intent, or at the very least a "reasonable implication" in
provision the "burden rests, as it does under existing law, with the party challenging the agency
action to show that the agency has acted outside [statutory] limits." 1982 HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 3, at 76.
The "burden of proof' characterization is confusing and should be avoided. As I have writ-
ten concerning a similar language problem in an earlier version of the amendment, "terminology
drawn from the law of evidence is not well suited for use in this context. When a judge [analyzes
nonfactual issues], he will perhaps consult logic, experience, tradition, precedent, or his con-
science; these decisional tools can hardly be equated with the intellectual processes by which an
evidentiary dispute is resolved." Levin, supra note 11, at 587, citing B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCEss (1921); see also Recommendations of the Ad. Conf. of the United
States, 1 C.F.R. § 305.79-6 (1982) ("a court, when passing on the validity of a regulation, does not
receive evidence but, rather, hears argument"). Indeed, the courts' "independence" on questions
of law, which the amendment aims to foster, is undermined if the resolution of a construction
issue depends on who fails to come forward with arguments for or against the agency's construc-
tion. It is much more natural to say that courts should apply their own legal reasoning to statutory
issues, guided by whatever principles of construction Congress may prescribe.
Moreover, the stated reasons for shifting a "burden of persuasion" under the first -sentence of
section 706(c) do not withstand scrutiny. The Senate Judiciary Committee explained:
This is not a revolutionary change. It is consistent with the Constitutional premise that
delegations of legislative power to unelected officials are to be narrowly construed. It is
also far easier to prove the affirmative, that an agency has jurisdiction, than to prove the
negative, that it does not.
1981 SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 32, at 170. One might agree with the Committee
that the defenders of agency jurisdiction can normally be asked to take the initiative in citing
sources of statutory authority that allegedly support the administrative action. Once these argu-
ments have been put on the table, however, it is not intrinsically "easier" for one side to win than
the other. As for the extraordinary "Constitutional premise" cited by the Committee, that propo-
sition has literally no support in any modern court decision of which I am aware. The most that
one can extract from the cases is that delegations are to be narrowly construed in a few unusual
sets of circumstances, such as when a broad interpretation might make the statute unconstitu-
tional. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
52. See, eg., 1981 SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 32, at 167, 171; 1981 SENATE
GOv'T AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 32, at 88-89; 1980 HousE REPORT, supra note 26, at 128
(Bumpers - Synar statement); 1981 HousE HEARiras, supra note 30, at 919 (testimony of Senator
Bumpers).
53. See 1981 SENATE Gov'T AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 32, at 91 (endorsing "application
of the full range of canons of statutory construction that have evolved in the courts"); 1980 SEN-ATE JUDICIARY REPORT, myprap note 23, at 66 (similar); 1980 House REPORT, supra note 26, at 54
("The Committee takes note of, and does not intend to change, the normal canons of statutory
construction that have evolved through the years.").
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the legislative materials, as support for jurisdictional rulings.54 This
may mean that the agency's defense of its jurisdiction to act in a given
situation must rely on more explicit indications of "legislative intent"
than judges (or at least some judges) would have considered adequate
before the amendment. Second, recall the intimations in the legislative
history that courts should place no reliance on an agency's views when
resolving jurisdictional issues.55 Here, the sponsors are not necessarily
denying that an agency's insights can be logically relevant to a court's
search for the meaning of an administrative statute. Rather, they evi-
dently assume that if judges are forbidden to use agency views as a
basis for resolving jurisdictional disputes, the result will be statutory
interpretations that correspond more closely to the social agenda of the
current Congress. Thus, the weight that the agency's position might
"warrant" according to the court's own judgment is not the weight it
"warrants" in light of the mildly anti-regulation policies of the Act.5 6
11. A CRTIQUE
The sponsors' reasons for including the jurisdiction provision are
somewhat difficult to discern. To be sure, the committee reports con-
tain many passages indicating that the provision will reaffirm the "con-
ventional responsibility of the judiciary to prevent agencies from
exceeding their powers."57 Arguing that the bureaucracy may become
dangerous if allowed to operate without checks on its power,58 the re-
ports also emphasize that lawmaking is preeminently the province of
elected legislators, who must rely on the courts to ensure that agencies
will conform to congressionally-prescribed policies.5 9 Arguments of
54. The language of the Senate Judiciary Committee quoted in the text atsupra note 33 is the
best illustration. See also supra notes 21, 23, 25, 31, 34, and accompanying text.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 22, 34.
56. One could conceivably interpret the first sentence of section 706(c) as a legislative finding
that an agency's views concerning its own jurisdiction have no probative force at all, and for that
reason "warrant" no weight. See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text. But this hypothetical
finding is not explicitly advanced anywhere in the legislative history and cannot be regarded as
more than a secondary rationale for the jurisdiction provision. Consideration of its implications
will therefore be postponed until later. See Id
57. 1981 SENATE GOV'T AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 32, at 88; accord, 1981 SENATE JUDICI-
AY REPORT, supra note 32, at 167; see, eg., id at 165 ("courts must do their duty by holding
invalid actions which are not authorized by [a] statutory delegation"); id at 178 (separate state-
ment of Senator Grassley); 1980 HousE REPORT, supra note 26, at 125 (Bumpers - Synar state-
ment) ("provision is intended to underscore that the courts must exercise their proper role in
ensuring that agencies do not transgress the outer boundaries of the authority given them by
Congress").
58. See 1981 SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, =pra note 32, at 164, 173.
59. See d at 164, 172; 1981 SENATE GOV'T AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 32, at 88.
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this kind, revolving around the traditional independence of the courts,
have been important selling points for the jurisdiction provision.
For two reasons, however, these arguments cannot be taken at face
value. First, they do not go far enough. The theme of judicial neutral-
ity does not explain why a reviewing court should be expected to look
for "affirmative evidence" of the legislature's will or to give agencies'
interpretations less weight than the court thinks they deserve. Second,
if the only purpose of the jurisdiction provision of section 706(c) were
to require the courts to interpret statutes conscientiously and be recep-
tive to anti-agency arguments, as the above passages might suggest if
read in isolation, the provision would be unnecessary. The second sen-
tence of section 706(c), as well as the addition of "independently" to
the opening sentence of section 706, are already designed to fulfill that
desire.6 The sponsors must have some additional reason for endors-
ing, in the case of issues of statutory jurisdiction, a standard of review
that is not only independent but downright resistant to agencies'
interpretations.
It seems reasonable to assume, and the reports themselves occa-
sionally suggest,61 that this additional purpose behind the jurisdiction
provision is nothing more complicated than an urge to curtail the
breadth and stringency of contemporary regulation. Senator Bumpers
spoke for many of his colleagues when, in one of his earliest speeches
on the Amendment, he declared: "The theme of overregulation recurs
with as much frequency [in congressional mail] as any other .... Cit-
izen groups of all kinds.., are unanimous in complaining that Gov-
ernment, most often manifested in regulations issued by executive or
administrative agencies, has become too intrusive. '62 Similar passages
pervade the legislative history of the Bumpers Amendment.63
This conclusion about the sponsors' motives is troubling, however,
because the jurisdiction provision would promote the goal of deregula-
tion in an essentially indiscriminate fashion. The provision would nul-
60. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
61. See 1981 SENATE JuDIcIARY REPORT, supra note 32, at 164 ("These amendments are
premised on ... a growing discontent with the degree to which Congress has delegated this
power to administrative agencies."). Elsewhere in the same report, however, the Committee
stopped short of unequivocally endorsing the proposition that there is "too much" regulation.
After surveying the "overregulation" literature in detail, the report concluded only that, whether
or not the compliance costs of regulation are actually excessive, the concerns raised by the litera-
ture are significant enough to warrant making improvements in the regulatory process. See id at
49-50.
62. 125 CONo. REc. 778 (1979) (remarks of Senator Bumpers).
63. See, ,'g., 1981 HousE HEARiNOS, supra note 30, at 16-17, 18-19 (remarks of Senator
Grassley); i at 65 (remarks of Representative McClory); Ad at 67 (statement of Representative
Pease).
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lify agency actions that are arguably ultra vires but that would have
been upheld were the court not directed to apply a principle of narrow
construction. Yet agency decisions that are arguably ultra vires are not
necessarily the most benighted ones, nor the most burdensome, nor the
most controversial. At least the amendment's proponents have never
made any kind of case for one or more of these propositions. 64 The
provision would turn rules and orders challenged on jurisdictional
grounds into objects of suspicion simply because they were the actions
of an administrative agency. To apply a principle of restrictive con-
struction so broadly risks condemning beneficial programs along with
harmful ones.65
A telling indication of the crudity of this reform strategy is the
weakness of the sponsors' attempt to invoke precedent to justify the
jurisdiction provision.66 The committee reports relied on cases in
64. Conceivably the sponsors have indeed concluded that when an agency ventures beyond
the authority that Congress clearly gave, the results are usually more harmful than the results of
other administrative actions. If this is in fact their view, the proposition should be greeted with
considerable skepticism. Naturally a Congressman would prefer to believe that the regulations
and orders about which his constituents so often complain are ones that he did not anticipate
when the underlying statutes were passed, but this convenient assumption may not correspond to
reality. One is reminded of the oft-noted propensity of legislators to shift blame for questionable
policies from themselves to administrators. According to the usual account, Congress passes a
vague statute, and loads the legislative history with ultimately inconsistent assurances that are
calculated to soothe all affected interest groups; the actual tradeoffs between competing values are
made later by those who implement the statute, and the individual legislator is then free to assure
his constituents that he never intended the statute to be used that way. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOC-
RACY AND DisTRusT 131-32 (1980); J. Davis, Regultory Reform and Congressional Control of
Regulation, 17 NEw ENo. L. REV. 1199, 1232-33 (1982); cf. Martin, The Legilative Veto and the
Responsible Exercise of Congre.rionalPower, 68 VA. L. REv. 253, 267-93 (1982) (a thorough treat-
ment in a related context). The issue of "who bears the greater blame" will not be pursued here,
however, because of the absence of any indication that the particular agency actions that would be
affected by the "jurisdiction" provision have been "targeted" on any basis at all.
65. See generally Gellhorn, Deregulation: Delight or Delurion?, 24 ST. Louis (J.L.J. 469
(1980) (cautioning against excessive efforts to achieve deregulation). For an analysis of how the
FCC's authority would be affected by a principle confining the Commission to those powers that
Congress has "dearly" expressed, see May, supra note 12. Similar inquiries could be pursued in
connection with other regulatory schemes but are beyond the scope of this article. One further
example may prove illuminating, however. The Federal Trade Commission's authority over "un-
fair methods of competition," 15 U.S.C. §45(a) (1976), was conferred about seventy years ago.
Should a court delimit the Commission's antitrust jurisdiction by consulting "the language of the
statute and other evidence of ascertainable legislative intent"? There is certainly much to criticize
in the FTCs recent antitrust record, but fixating on the views of the Sixty-Third Congress seems a
most unpromising solution to those deficiencies.
66. See 1981 SENATE JUDiCIARY REPoRT, supra note 32, at 166-67; 1980 HousE REPORT,
supra note 26, at 124-25 (Bumpers-Synar statement). In addition to the cases discussed in the
accompanying text, the reports cited FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979). This
reliance was certainly ill-founded, since the decision in Midwest Video was based on a specific
statutory policy embedded in the Communications Act and did not articulate any principle of
narrow construction at all. Moreover, Midwest Video seemed to assume the correctness of United
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which the Supreme Court has followed what is sometimes called a
"clear statement" approach,67 holding administrative actions unauthor-
ized because Congress had not explicitly conferred the powers the
agency claimed. These cases do not, however, support the policy of the
jurisdiction provision. In each of them, the Court was dealing with
subjects that it viewed as unusually sensitive.68 The Court has not re-
motely suggested that the entire spectrum of administrative conduct
should be regarded with disfavor in the same sense that these unusual
examples were. To ignore this distinction is to miss the central point
about the "clear statement" line of authority.69
The Senate Judiciary Committee also optimistically predicted that
"closer judicial reading of the statutory authority of agencies, perhaps
producing decisions that agencies have no authority to act in some situ-
ations, will be an incentive for the Congress to 'canalize' more specifi-
cally its delegations of law making power to agencies." 70 The
Committee's theory of legislative behavior is novel, to say the least.
Considering how often Congress now yields to the temptation to avoid
responsibility,71 one can only assume that an aggressive judicial assault
on "overregulation" would simply provide members of Congress with
an additional excuse to sit back and watch judges relieve them of hav-
ing to cope with vexing regulatory issues. It is unrealistic to assume
that Congress would frequently address those issues on "remand" and
make the final decisions. Moreover, if the first sentence of section
706(c) brought about a sizable increase in the number of judicial deci-
States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), one of the all-time classic illustrations of
expansive interpretation of regulatory legislation.
67. See, eg., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW 288-89 (1978); Krent, Avoidance
and its Costs: Application of the Clear Statement Rule to Supreme Court Review of NRZB Cases, 15
CONN. L. REv. 209 (1983); Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican4dmainistrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1680-81 (1975).
68. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (avoidance of serious first amendment
issues); National Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, 415 U.S. 336 (1974) (avoidance of constitutional
question of whether Congress could transfer its taxing power to an agency); Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116 (1958) (avoidance of serious intrusion on civil liberties).
69. In this connection the Bumpers-Synar statement cited Professor Richard B. Stewart's ob-
servation that a judicial "policy of narrow construction of regulatory statues might usefully be
followed," so that Congress would "have to take a fresh look at the agency's mandate before its
powers were extended." 1980 HousE REPORT, supra note 26, at 124, citing Stewart,.spra note 67,
at 1697. It must be pointed out that Stewart's remark, read in context, is a tentative and almost
offhand comment, not a thesis developed at any length. Later in the same article, Stewart ex-
presses strong reservations about the wisdom of an essentially equivalent proposal. Seeid at 1788-
89.
70. 1981 SENATE JuDIcIARY REPORT, supra note 32, at 172; accord, id at 63.
71. See supra note 64.
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sions holding agency actions to be ultra vires, the chances of Congress'
acting on any given one of them would be small indeed.72
The prospect that the narrow-construction policy of section 706(c)
might actually remove pressure for Congress to step into regulatory dis-
putes suggests a particularly discouraging thought about the jurisdic-
tion provision. The preeminent task of a legislature is to provide
direction on matters of fundamental government policy. In the context
of a national commitment to reducing regulation, that task ought to
entail identifying particular agencies or programs that are not perform-
.ing satisfactorily. The jurisdiction provision, however, embodies a fun-
damentally different strategy-it merely identifies the antiregulation
goal and leaves unelected federal judges the entire responsibility for
deciding how to achieve that goal. Thus revision of the scope-of-re-
view section of the APA is not only one of the least efficient ways by
which Congress might promote "regulatory relief," but is also one of
the least consistent with democratic ideals. 73
III. SOME PROBLEMS OF DRAFTMANSHIP
Reasonable persons might disagree about the fundamental wis-
dom of the jurisdiction provision. At a minimum, however, the Bump-
ers Amendment ought to be worded so that courts will have adequate
guidance about what Congress expects them to do. This section of the
comment will explore whether the jurisdiction provision, as now writ-
ten, provides such guidance.
Although three legislative committees voted to adopt the jurisdic-
tion provision in 1981 without altering it, that unanimity is misleading.
Sheer inertia in the deliberative process undoubtedly limited the possi-
bility of improvements in the provision's language. 74 In addition, the
committees evidently decided that they could appease critics by tinker-
ing with the legislative history, instead of improving the terms of the
72. See Stewart, supra note 67, at 1788-89; c. McGowan, supra note 11, at 1145-46 (arguing
that an across-the-board power to "veto" administrative rules would not give Congress an effec-
tive tool of oversight because of the vast number of regulations published each year); Scalia, The
Legsative Veto: A False Remedyfor System Overload, REo., Nov.-Dec. 1979, at 19 (same).
73. It might also be argued that because the amendment is nothing but a mild "signal" to the
courts, it does not matter that the 'Jurisdiction" provision is imprecise in its thrust; the narrow.
construction policy will be only one of the judge's considerations and common sense will in no
event be displaced. There is certainly force to the premise of this argument. Although I disagree
with commentators who regard scope-of-review theory as an empty exercise, see Levin, supra note
11, at 579-81, fine adjustments in the statutory standard of review for jurisdictional issues proba-
bly could have no more than a slight impact on the institution of judicial review. Nevertheless, if
the narrow-construction policy is an unsound strategy of reform, the "signal" should not be sent,
whether its impact proves large or small.
74. See 1981 HousE HEARiNGs. supra note 30, at 97 (remarks of Representative Danielson).
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proposed statute.75 As a result, the draftsmanship of the jurisdiction
provision remains decidedly imperfect.
A. "Jurisdiction or Authority."
Although the nature of the principle of construction that the first
sentence of section 706(c) imposes may be elusive, there at least is no
doubt that the amendment applies that principle only to issues of statu-
tory "jurisdiction or authority." One can predict with almost complete
confidence that the courts will have a difficult time identifying the par-
ticular issues that fall into this category.76
The negotiators who drafted section 706(c) in 1980 did not prepare
any legislative history to explain this phrase. They may have assumed
that there is a well-established or generally recognized category of ju-
risdictional issues in administrative law.77 If they did, they were mis-
taken. The Supreme Court has occasionally written administrative law
opinions suggesting special consideration for jurisdictional matters,7'
but these suggestions have not taken hold, and there is no indication
that the original drafters had any of these obscure doctrines in mind
when they referred to issues of jurisdiction. If anything, these intima-
tions in the case law illustrate the slipperiness of the "jurisdiction"
label.79
75. Curiously, the same sort of manipulation of legislative history has been common
throughout the development of the APA. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1142 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (Freedom of Information Act); 1 K. DAvis, ADmINIsTRATivE LAW TREATISE § 5:3 (2d ed.
1978) (same); Conard, New Ways to Write Laws, 56 YALE L.J. 458, 461 & n.13 (1947) (original
APA).
76. See 1981 HousE HEARINGS, supra note 30, at 913-15 (testimony of Judges McGowan and
Arnold).
77. See 1979-80 HOUSE HEAuNGs, supra note 19, at 746 (testimony of Senator Bumpers); id
at 1103 (ABA-Business Roundtable memorandum). Both of the cited statements appear to take
the distinction between "jurisdictional" and "other" legal questions for granted, evidently because
the spokesmen assumed that the necessity of drawing a distinction between these two types of
questions would not be especially troublesome.
78. The most famous example is the holding in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 64-65 (1932),
that "jurisdictional facts" found by an agency may be retried by the courts in de novo evidentiary
proceedings. This much-scorned ruling has never possessed vitality beyond its facts, see generally
B. ScuwARTz, ADmNLsTRATtVE LAw §§ 228-29 (1976), and its holding has recently been specifi-
cally disapproved. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858,
2877 n.34 (1982) (plurality opinion); id at 2891 n.12 (dissent). Elsewhere the Court has indicated
that one may challenge an agency's action on a "jurisdictional" ground without having previously
raised the issue at the administrative level, United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33,
38 (1952) (dictum); City of Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685 (1944), and has entertained
challenges to actions that would have been considered unreviewable if a jurisdictional" defect
had not been alleged. See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S.
114(1946).
79. City of Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. at 695 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (jurisdic-
tion concept is "one of the most deceptive of legal pitfalls"); see also United States v. L.A. Tucker
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The legislative committees that reviewed the bill in 1981 and 1982
recognized the need for definitional guidance, but their efforts to arrive
at a consensus about the reach of the first sentence of section 706(c)
were unsuccessful. All three of the committee reports supporting the
bill agreed that the word "jurisdiction" in section 706(c) should be
given its "conventional meaning"'S0 -it would "encompass only thresh-
old questions as to the power of an agency to act with respect to the
subject matter or persons to be regulated."81 The committees dis-
agreed, however, on whether the word "authority" in the first sentence
of section 706(c) adds anything to the breadth of the provision. The
Senate Government Affairs Committee and the House Judiciary Com-
mittee maintained that it did not,82 and thus adopted the view that the
first sentence of section 706(c) deals only with issues of "jurisdiction" in
the conventional sense. The Senate Judiciary Committee, on the other
hand, apparently interpreted the term "authority" in the provision as
coming into play whenever "an agency's action is alleged to be in ex-
Truck Lines, 344 U.S. at 39 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (jurisdiction is "a verbal coat of too many
colors"); ICC v. Northern Pacific Ry., 216 U.S. 538,544 (1910) (Holmes, J.). Nor have attempts to
identify the term in ordinary civil litigation been particularly satisfactory. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 comment e (1982); id § 69 comment b.
The experience of British administrative law is also instructive. Traditionally, "excess ofju-
risdiction" has been one of the few grounds on which King's Bench would control by certiorari or
prohibition the decisions of administrative tribunals. "In practice the distinction between matters
going to jurisdiction (collateral and preliminary matters) and matters within jurisdiction (or going
to the merits) is often almost impossible to draw." S. DE SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW 552 (1971); see S. DE SMITH, JUDICIAL REvIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 114-15
(J. Evans 4th ed. 1980). Central in recent controversy has been the leading case of Anisminic Ltd.
v. Foreign Compensation Comm'n, [1969] 2 A.C. 147. The case dealt with a preclusion-of-review
statute construed as permitting review of 'jurisdictional" errors only. The legal error of which
Anisminic complained, however, was picayune. (The Commission was authorized to grant com-
pensation to persons whose property had been expropriated by the Egyptian government, pro-
vided that the victim "and any person who became successor in title of such person... were
British nationals .. " Id Anisminic, a British firm, had sold most of its assets to an Egyptian
company but had retained a compensation claim Thus, the substantive question was whether, as
the Commision had held, the nationality of the victim's "successor in title" was material even if
title to the claim itself had not shifted.) The House of Lords held that the Commission had ex-
ceeded its jurisdiction by asking itself the wrong question and basing its decision on an irrelevant
consideration. See I at 171, 195, 210 (opinions of, respectively, Lord Reid, Lord Pearce, and
Lord Wilberforce). Prestigious Englishjurists have maintained thatAnrminic's notion ofjurisdic-
tional error is so sweeping that the distinction has, in effect, been obliterated. See Racal Commu-
nications Ltd., 1981 A.C. 374, 383 (Lord Diplock); Pearlman v. Keepers of Harrow School, 1979
Q.B. 56,70 (CA.) (Lord Denning, M.R.). See geneall, H. WADE, ADMINiSTRATIVE LAW 264-67
(5th ed. 1982).
80. 1981 SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, JUpra note 32, at 168.
81. 1982 HOUSE REPoRT,mra note 3, at 75;accord, 1981 SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, sUpra
note 32, at 168; 1981 SENATE GOV'T AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 32, at 89.
82. 1981 SENATE GOV'T AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 32, at 89; 1982 HousE REPORT, jupra
note 3, at 75.
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cess of its statutory authority"-whenever the agency's reading of its
statutory mandate is claimed to be too expansive.8 3 When the "conse-
quence of the [agency's] conclusion would be a lessening rather than an
increase of regulation," the Committee said, the first sentence would
not be triggered.84
The Senate Judiciary Committee's notion that the applicability of
the phrase should turn on whether the agency is expanding regulation
or reducing it is entirely unacceptable. This interpretation would re-
quire the courts to give the phrase "jurisdiction or authority" a mean-
ing that is drastically at odds with common usage. It would mean, for
example, that if the NLRB decides in one case that foremen are beyond
the reach of the National Labor Relations Act, and in another case that
buyers are within the Act's reach,85 the latter decision would implicate
"jurisdiction or authority," but the former would not. Yet these two
cases are self-evidently similar, and if one of them triggers section
706(c), the other should as well. The Senate Judiciary Committee's
construction would also mean that if the Board decides in one case that
buyers are exempt from the Act, and later changes its mind and decides
that they are covered,86 only the latter ruling would involve "jurisdic-
tion or authority."87 This distinction is so artificial that it is unlikely to
find favor in the courts.
The Senate Judiciary Committee apparently rested its interpreta-
tion on the premise that when a litigant alleges that an agency has vio-
lated its mandate by engaging in too little regulation, the grievance
does not involve "jurisdiction or authority" but instead is a claim that
the agency's action is "short of statutory right."88 The Committee was
83. See 1981 SENATE JuDIcIARY REPORT, supra note 32, at 168.
84. Id
85. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 270, 277-78 (1974).
86. This actually happened in BellAerospace. See 416 U.S. at 285-87.
87. A practical difficulty with the Senate Judiciary Committee's approach is that the review-
ing court sometimes will not know whether sustaining an agency's statutory interpretation would
lead to more regulation or less. The court cannot make such an assessment intelligently unless it
knows how the agency would react to a repudiation of its favored construction. It is erroneous to
assume that if a given approach to a regulatory problem is held to be ultra vires, more stringent
approaches are also necessarily foreclosed. See, eg., Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434
U.S. 275 (1978) (majority held that EPA lacked statutory power to impose moderate restraints on
demolition companies' emissions of asbestos insulation and fireproofing, even though, as Justice
Stevens' dissent pointed out, id at 297, the agency would have had clear statutory authority to ban
the emissions entirely); Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 619 (1944) (remand-
ing Wage-Hour Administrator's regulation classifying companies by size, because the Administra-
tor had been obliged to classify them in terms of geography only; Court noted that it would be
"sheerest guesswork" to assume that the defendant company would be better off under the new
regulation than under the old one).
88. See 1981 SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 32, at 168.
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referring to section 706(2)(C) of the APA, which instructs courts to set
aside agency actions that are "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, au-
thority, or limitations, or short of statutory right."8 9 This language has
never before been read to suggest that "jurisdiction" and "authority"
refer to statutory ceilings on agency action, and "rights" to statutory
floors. Linguistically, an agency's infringement of someone's statutory
"rights" could always be described as a violation of its "authority." 90 If
section 706(2)(C) does contain any language supporting the Commit-
tee's distinction, that language is the words "in excess" and "short
of!---words that do not appear in the Bumpers Amendment. 91
The approach of the Senate Government Affairs Committee and
the House Judiciary Committee (hereinafter called "the House ap-
proach") seems more promising. Under this approach, the first sen-
tence of section 706(c) refers only to "threshold questions as to the
power of an agency to act with respect to the subject matter or persons
to be regulated." 92 A fair paraphrase may be that the controversy must
relate to whether Congress authorized the agency to regulate the person
or subject at all-not to whether the agency is regulating in the manner
Congress specified. This definition has the virtue of corresponding
roughly to ordinary conceptions of a jurisdictional question, but it still
is extremely vague.93 For example, the two committees endorsing the
House approach apparently considered it self-evident that FCC v. Na-
tional Citizens Committeefor Broadcasting94 did not involve "jurisdic-
tion" according to their usage.95 In National Citizens Committee the
Court held that the FCC may prohibit any broadcast licensee from ac-
quiring a newspaper that is published in the same locality as the broad-
89. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1976). It will be renumbered § 706(aX2)(C) if the amendment is
enacted.
90. Trying to distinguish actions "in excess of statutory authority" from actions "short of
statutory right" on the basis of the natural meaning of these words could prove a frustrating
endeavor. For example, intuition might well suggest that if the IRS erroneously includes a sum of
money in a taxpayer's income, it is acting beyond its authority;, if it erroneously disallows a deduc-
tion, it is withholding a statutory right. But would anyone seriously argue that the standard of
review for tax cases involving income should differ from the standard for tax cases involving
deductions?
91. The Committee also seems to have overlooked the word "limitations," which-like "stat-
utory right"-appeaxs in section 706(2XC) but not in the first sentenen of proposed section 706(c).
The Committee's attempt to bifurcate the language of section 706(2)(C), as a guide to the applica-
bility of the Bumpers Amendment's narrow-construction rule, would apparently force courts to
determine whether a given action is "in excess of statutory authority" or merely "in excess of
statutory limitations." The Committee did not explain how such determinations could be made.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
93. See authorities cited supra note 79.
94. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
95. See 1981 SENATE GOV'T AFFAIRs REPORT, stpra note 32, at 90; 1982 HOUSE REPORT,
=upra note 3, at 75.
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caster's listening audience. The two committees probably reasoned
that this holding was not jurisdictional because a broadcast licensee is a
person who is obviously subject to FCC regulation. But one could ar-
gue no less logically that since the subject of cross-ownership of news-
papers and broadcast stations was a matter that the Commission had
never before regulated, the FCC's initiative did expand its
jurisdiction.96
The main reason courts are likely to have difficulty classifying is-
sues as jurisdictional or otherwise, under the House approach, is that
the distinction it posits appears to be arbitrary. Why is there a special
need to curb agencies' extensions of authority to new persons or new
subject areas, but less need to curb agencies' adoption of stringent poli-
cies that are plainly within their jurisdiction? 97 The committee reports
supporting the House approach contain no satisfactory answer.98 It is
possible, however, to identify a rationale that could have led the draft-
ers of the amendment to devise a special rule of construction for "juris-
dictional" issues in the House's sense. The first sentence of section
706(c) can be interpreted as reflecting an accommodation of two con-
96. As though to underscore the depth of the disagreement among the committees, the Senate
Judiciary Committee cited National Citizens Committee as its principal example of a situation that
had involved a question of the FCC's 'Jurisdiction or authority." 1981 SENATE JUDiCIARY RE-
PORT, supra note 32, at 168.
97. It would be difficult to argue that jurisdictional issues, as the House approach defines
them, are intrinsically more significant than other statutory issues in administrative cases. In the
important and celebrated Cotton Dust case, American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
490 (1981), for example, no one doubted that OSHA was acting within its legitimate sphere of
activity-its 'jurisdiction"--when it addressed the health risks of cotton dust. The question was
whether OSHA acted in a statutorily authorized manner when it refused to weigh costs against
benefits.
98. The only attempt to justify this distinction came from the House Judiciary Committee,
which offered the following explanation:
Most challenges to agency action do not involve a question of "jurisdiction" or "author-
ity' under the Committee's understanding of those terms, because the agency's power to
deal with the subject matter is often apparent from the statute and therefore is undis-
puted. Instead litigation commonly focuses on the interpretation of a statutory standard
ythe agency-on how the agency should fulfill its responsibilities to regulate in a cer-
tain area, not whether it has the jurisdiction to regulate in that area. In these cases, of
course, the special review standard of subsection (c) does not apply. Indeed, it could not
meaningfully be applied, because many, perhaps most, questions involving the manner
in which an agency has exercised its power are not answered by the language of the
statute or a specific statement in the legislative history. Often such questions can only be
resolved by determining whether the agency interpretation is reasonable and consistent
with the legislative purpose. This determination often entails some deference to the
agency's status as administrator of the statute and to its experience in implementing it on
a day-to-day basis.
1982 HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 75-76. If the Committee meant that deference to agencies
should be prohibited in jurisdictional disputes alone because those disputes are relatively uncom-
mon, that is not an intelligible justification. If, however, the Committee meant that deference is
especially helpful or appropriate in nonjurisdictional disputes, it may have been alluding ob-
liquely to the considerations discussed in the next few paragraphs of text.
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flicting attitudes toward judicial deference to agencies' interpretations
of statutes. 99
On the one hand, the drafters may have been influenced by the
frequently-heard accusation that agencies tend to be biased in favor of
expanding their jurisdiction. 100 One could thus understand the first
sentence of section .706(c) as an attempt to counterbalance the "mis-
sion-oriented" character of the bureaucratic mind.10 The amendment
would be read as saying that jurisdictional questions should be an-
swered without regard to agencies' views because on those issues ad-
ministrators deserve no deference.
Standing alone, however, this reasoning would not satisfactorily
explain the limitation of the narrow-construction rule to jurisdictional
matters. After all, it is not clear that the bias toward expanding juris-
diction is any more pronounced than agencies' bias in favor of policies
that are within their jurisdiction but are arguably stricter than the gov-
erning statute allows.' 02 The amendment certainly does not forbid
courts to give weight to administrators' views concerning the latter type
of issue.
It is therefore necessary to posit a second, offsetting premise: the
drafters may have believed that in the case of nonjurisdictional issues
of statutory construction, an agency often requires flexibility if it is to
protect its programs from failure. Especially in highly technical areas,
99. The reasoning that follows owes much to the unpublished remarks of Professor Thomas
0. McGarity at an Association of American Law Schools Workshop on Teaching Administrative
Law, March 5, 1982. Professor McGarity, it should be noted, was discussing the standards of
substantive review that he himself might prefer--not analyzing the Bumpers Amendment. He
deserves no blame for my adaptation of his remarks to the present context.
100. See, eg., Hi-Craft Clothing Co. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 910, 916 (3d Cir. 1981); Wilson, The
Rise of the Bureaucratic State, 41 PuB. INTEREST 77, 81, 97 (1975); Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the
Adminirtrative Process.: A Reevaluation, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1105, 1113-19 (1954). This generaliza-
tion about administrators' attitudes is, of course, not universally reliable, especially under the
Reagan Administration, but it may, nevertheless, have been a source of inspiration for the Bump-
ers Amendment.
I01. q Stewart, supra note 67, at 1785 (suggesting that the Court's disdain for the Transpor-
tation Department's interpretation of highway legislation in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), may have reflected a similsr perceived need for a counter-
weight to agency singlemindedness). Stewart himself does not recommend that the courts' tech-
nique of construing administrative statutes so as to counteract agency biases be used more
frequently. He argues that this device would often be ineffective; that it might unduly restrict
agency flexibility, and that "creative" judicial efforts to refashion regulatory mandates might
sometimes turn the agency's organic statute into a muddle. See Stewart, supra, at 1785-86.
102. Seegeneraly E. BARDACH & R. KAOAN, GOING BY THE Boox: THE PROBLEM OF REou-
LATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982) (condemning excessively stringent enforcement policies,
most of which would appear to have raised no jurisdictional issues in the House's sense of that
term). Thus when the Senate Judiciary Committee commented on what it believed was agencies'
"mission-orientation," 1981 SENATE JUDIcIARY REPORT, supra note 32, at 60-61 (collecting
sources), its discussion did not especially emphasize jurisdictional issues.
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regulation can be a complex chore. The agency's technical insights and
involvement with the subject matter may reveal to it a need for imple-
mentation strategies that might appear, in the abstract, to be slightly at
variance with the instructions of Congress. The point of the second
sentence of section 706(c) may be that the agency should be allowed, in
this situation, to make "improvements" on Congress' choice of imple-
mentation strategies, because strict compliance with the historical legis-
lative intent might cause it to fail in the achievement of the very goals
Congress instructed it to further. A judge who tries to supervise an
agency's choice of methodology too closely may venture well beyond
his technical depth.103
This reasoning, one might argue, normally has less force when a
jurisdictional determination is involved. An agency's decision as to
which persons or activities it will regulate is generally more clearcut.
There is comparatively little risk that judicial rejection of the agency's
position on such an issue will sabotage an intricate regulatory mecha-
nism. The argument would run, therefore, that Congress prefers in
these situations to be skeptical about the worth of agencies' views on
statutory issues; its fear of administrators' institutional biases overshad-
ows any possibility that the agency might have useful insights to which
weight should be given in resolving the jurisdictional issue.10 4
The reasoning of the preceding paragraphs implies that a court
following the House approach should be inclined to treat a statutory
103. For expressions of this reasoning in the existing case law, see, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co.
v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555 (1980); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566
n.20 (1979) (dictum); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 134 & n.25 (1977).
Professor McGarity, see supra note 99, regards the Benzene case, Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-
CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980), as a decision in which the plurality failed
to heed this principle, and thereby strayed into a reading of the OSHA statute that rested upon
misconceptions about the art of risk assessment.
The rationale offered in the text has force even when the Court is engaged in relatively pure
statutory construction-unequivocally a "question of law." Thus, the analysis can be accepted
without any need to explore the methods by which a court copes with "mixed" questions of law,
fact, and discretion.
104. Another way to express the argument developed in the text is that section 706(c) recog-
nizes the cogency of some of the traditional axioms the courts have used to justify deference, but
rejects others as unpersuasive. In the latter category would fall those maxims that do not distin-
guish jurisdictional from nonjurisdictional issues, such as that a court should give weight to an
agency's interpretation simply because it is charged with administering the statute, see, e.g.,
Blanding v. DuBose, 454 U.S. 393, 401 (1982), or that the interpretation deserves weight because
the agency has followed it continuously or for many years, see, ag., EEOC v. Associated Dry
Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590,600 n.17 (1981). A logical corollary of Congress' stance--or so private
counsel could reasonably argue-would be that courts should no longer follow these latter max-
ims even when the issue of construction is not jurisdictional The only deference principles that
courts should observe (the argument would run) would be those that have special application to
nonjurisdictional issues. But see mura note 44 (congressional endorsement of Skidmore formula).
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issue as jurisdictional when (a) there is maximal likelihood that the
agency's viewpoint was colored by a desire to aggrandize its power, and
(b) there is minimal risk that an adverse decision will interfere with the
internal coherence of the agency's program. This attempt to under-
stand why the narrow-construction rule is limited to jurisdictional is-
sues admittedly involves some crude generalizations.10 5 It is a start,
however, and if the courts prove to be sufficiently creative, 16 they may
be able to extrapolate arguments of this kind into a usable definition.
At least this attempt avoids the conclusion that Congress adopted the
"jurisdiction" limitation without any coherent analytical justification at
all. That pessimistic view ought to be resisted-even if it does accord
with the historical facts.
B. The Types of "Agency Action." Covered.
This section explores a few specific respects in which the over-
breadth of the jurisdiction provision is especially apparent. It also ex-
amines a minor change in the amendment that might go far to
105. For example, when the Court upheld the FCC's authority over cable television operators
in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), the issue was clearly jurisdic-
tional, but the Court's rationale was similar to the argument supporting deference in cases dealing
with implementation: "the Commission has reasonably concluded that regulatory authority over
CATV is imperative if it is to perform with appropriate effectiveness certain of its other responsi-
bilities." Id at 173. This reasoning was critical to the Court's holding, since the language and
legislative history of the organic statute were conspicuously unhelpful to the FCC's position.
106. Also suggestive are these comments about the jurisdiction provision from the Bumpers-
Synar statement:
In making such determinations, the court undoubtedly will be influenced not only
by the statute's legislative history but also by the nature of the asserted power. If, for
example, the agency is seeking to assert a basic or significant extension of authority,
especially one which bears on personal liberties, or heralds significant involvement of the
agency in a new area or imposes significant costs, the reviewing court should not uphold
the extension unless it is conscientiously convinced that the statute and relevant legal
materials demonstrate that Congress specifically or generally addressed the issue, and
that the statute does contain the authority asserted by the agency. On the other hand, if
the asserted authority at issue relates to an interstitial or minor matter, the reviewing
court might well conclude that although Congress had not really addressed the issue, the
matter is of such a character that sensible administration necessarily requires exercise of
such an implementing authority.
1980 HousE REPORT, .upra note 26, at 125; accord, 1981 SENATE JuDicIARY REPORT, .Upra note
32, at 169-70, 1981 SENATE GOV'T AFFAiRS REPORT, supra note 32, at 91-92. This passage is not
explicitly directed toward the question of how jurisdictional issues may be distinguished from
other statutory issues, but there is something to be said in favor of the courts' adapting it to this
context. Read critically, the passage seems to be saying that if the court regards the case at bar as
exteptionally important, its standard of review should be stricter than if the court finds the case
relatively mundane. As a general proposition I do not favor the somewhat circular view that
courts reviewing agency action should decide on an ad hoc, subjective basis what standard of
review they will use. With regard to allocating questions between the first and second sentences of
section 706(c), however, the text of the amendment is so perplexing that recognition of broad
discretion in the courts to make this classification as they see fit may be the lesser evil.
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ameliorate, if not eliminate, the overkill inherent in the first sentence of
section 706(c).
First, the language of the provision affords no basis for distin-
guishing between agencies' efforts to expand their sphere of regulation
and their efforts to restrict it. Suppose, for example, that an agency
adopts an unexpectedly narrow interpretation of its own jurisdictional
limits.Y07 If the second sentence of section 706(c) were applicable, that
determination would be entitled to whatever persuasive weight it "war-
rants" during judicial review. But by hypothesis the issue is jurisdic-
tional; therefore, the second sentence does not apply. Instead, the first
sentence of section 706(c) applies, and directs the court to look only to
the language of the statute and "other evidence of legislative intent."
Thus, to the extent that the first sentence of section 706(c) forbids
courts to accord special weight to the enforcing agency's views, it may
serve to slow rather than to facilitate deregulation. This effect scarcely
comports with the antigovernment rhetoric with which the amendment
has been promoted. It is on this ground that Professor (now Judge)
Scalia, a solidly conservative observer, has criticized the amendment.108
By legitimizing activism on the part of the federal judiciary, he argues,
the bill might actually reduce the ability of a conservative executive
branch, such as the Reagan Administration, to respond to public pres-
sure to rescind unwise regulations. 109
Apparently stung by this line of argument, proponents of the
amendment have publicly argued that the "primary thrust" of the juris-
diction sentence is to discourage "positive" or "affirmative" agency ac-
107. For cases in which agencies have been ordered to exercise jurisdiction, see, e.g., FPC v.
Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380 (1974) (dictum); Office Employees Int'l Union Local 11 v. NLRB, 353
U.S. 313 (1957); Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Center v. Richardson, 486 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1973);
Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs andlPrvate Rights, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1193, 1197 n.13 (1982)
(citing thirteen additional cases); tf. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 622-23
(1944) (recognizing judicial power to require agency to exercise jurisdiction). Although some of
the cases collected by Stewart & Sunstein might be best described as finding agency inaction to be
an abuse of discretion, and thus as not implicating section 706(c), others do appear to turn on
jurisdictional determinations. Eg., Carpet, Linoleum & Resilient Tile Layers, Local 419 v.
Brown, 656 F.2d 564 (10th Cir. 1981); Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en
banc).
108. Scalia, Regulatory R/orm--2e Game lias Changed, 5 REG., Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 13, 13-
14. As Scalia elsewhere points out, the "common law ofjudicial review" does distinguish between
agency action and inaction. Scalia, Rulemaking as Poltics, 34 AD. L REv. v, vii (Summer 1982).
The Bumpers Amendment, however, at least in its jurisdiction provision, breaks with the case law.
Whether the courts would read into the amendment the judicially developed asymmetry to which
Scalia refers is difficult to predict.
109. For a survey of court challenges to the Reagan Administration's efforts at deregulation,




tion, as opposed to action by which the agency declines to regulate.110
These assurances, however, ignore the language of the APA, which ex-
pressly defines "agency action" to include "failure to act""' and thus
militates strongly against any distinction between positive and negative
administrative decisions. Considering how conspicuously the text of
the jurisdiction provision seems to favor statutory language over extrin-
sic aids to construction," 2 it is ironic to observe the sponsors trying to
use legislative history to negate what the APA says on its face.
Even if the jurisdiction provision is somehow construed as inhib-
iting only extensions of administrative activity rather than contractions,
it may reach too far. The sponsors of the amendment seem to have
overlooked the applicability of the APA review standards to much
more than "regulation" in the everyday sense. Section 706 also applies
to the dissemination of government benefits." 3 People who want a
passport, a research grant, or a Social Security check do not come to
court trying to "get the government off their backs." On the contrary,
such people are likely to complain if the government fails to give them
the benefits they want.
The first sentence of section 706(c) could only work to the disad-
vantage of people seeking such benefits. The facts of Morton v. Ruiz" 4
can be used to illustrate the point. Ruiz, a Papago Indian who lived
near his tribe's reservation, applied for general assistance benefits
under the Snyder Act.115 The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) denied
the application, believing that Congress had limited eligibility to Indi-
ans living on reservations. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that
Congress had imposed no such restriction. Now suppose the Bumpers
Amendment had been law at the time Ruiz was decided. Because sec-
tion 706(c) would require the courts to insist on more statutory support
for an extension of jurisdiction than has previously been necessary, the
government would more likely have cited the amendment against Ruiz
than the other way around. The same logic would operate in other
situations in which disputes over an agency's authority to withhold
110. See, eg., 1981 HOUSE HnARmos, jupra note 30, at 55-56 (testimony of Senator Bump-
ers); 1980 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 26, at 126 (Bumpers - Synar statement).
111. "'[A]gency action' includes the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction,
relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.. . ." 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1976). The
definition applies to the APA's judicial review provisions by virtue of section 701(bX2).
112. See ifa notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
113. See, eg., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977).
114. 415 U.S. 199 (1974). The administrative law pronouncements in the case have been
poorly received in the press, see, eg., Davis, Administrative Law Surprises in the Ruiz Case, 75
COLUM. L. Rnv. 823 (1975), but its substantive holding has escaped similar criticism.
115. 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1976).
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funds arise, including various types of individual welfare programs,116
as well as grant-in-aid programs such as construction grants." 7 It is
hard to see how any reading of the jurisdiction provision could permit
the courts to differentiate between welcome and unwelcome govern-
mental action."" Here again, the jurisdiction provision of the amend-
ment appears to extend further than its supporters have seriously
contemplated. What member of Congress would like his constituents
to learn that he voted to build an anticlaimant bias into the system for
judicial review of Social Security rulings?
The sponsors of the amendment could ameliorate the problems
just mentioned if they were to change the word "action" in the first
sentence of section 706(c) to "sanction." A little-known provision of
the APA defines "sanction" to include a "prohibition, requirement,
limitation, or other condition affecting the freedom of a person;...
imposition of penalty or fine;" and other specifically named types of
"compulsory or restrictive action."" 9 "Sanction" is used as a comple-
116. See, eg., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (Medicaid); Lopez Diaz v. Secre-
tary of HEW, 585 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1978) (Social Security disability benefits); Griffis v. Wein-
berger, 509 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1975) (Social Security disability benefits); Bermudez v. USDA, 490
F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1104 (1973) (food stamps); Knowles v. Butz, 358 F.
Supp. 228 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (food stamps).
117. See, e.g., Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975) (pollution control funds);
Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 136 (1947) (highway construction
funds); City of Los Angeles v. Adams, 556 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (airport construction funds).
118. The most promising argument for Ruiz would be that the first sentence of section 706(c),
by its explicit language, comes into play only when agency action is alleged to be "in excess of
statutory jurisdiction [or] authority" under section 706(2)(C), not where it is alleged to be "short of
statutory right" as used in the same subsection. To be sure, there is no difficulty fitting his griev-
ance into the "short of statutory right" category of section 706(2)(C). But this characterization
does not show that an attack on the statutory foundation of a denial of monetary benefits cannot
also be described as raising a question of the agency's jurisdiction. In fact, the Court in Ruiz
explicitly referred to the issue before it as implicating the BIA's "jurisdiction," 415 U.S. at 229
n.24. This is not an inescapable description, perhaps, but it is by no means a strained one, either.
The case law has simply never drawn distinctions among the various categories of section
706(2)(C), and, as noted earlier, the drafters of the Bumpers Amendment experienced great diffi-
culty trying to fashion workable distinctions. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. In
any event, none of the committee reports indicated that the notion of jurisdiction should turn on
whether the agency expands its power by spreading "good news," such as money, or "bad news,"
such as a regulation constraining the freedom of those it addresses.
119. The full definition of "sanction" is:
the whole or a part of an agency-
(A) prohibition, requirement, limitation, or other condition affecting the freedom of
a person;
(B) withholding of relief;
(C) imposition of penalty or fine;
(D) destruction, taking, seizure, or withholding of property,
(E) assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution, compensation, costs, charges
or fees;
(F) requirement, revocation, or suspension of a license; or
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ment to "relief," which the APA defines as action "beneficial to... a
person," such as a "grant of money . . . [or] exemption."1 20 These
terms have never received any serious attention, because the operative
provisions of the APA almost always treat sanctions and relief identi-
cally.121 But the jurisdiction provision of the Bumpers Amendment
presents a situation in which the sanction-relief distinction would be
helpful. Limiting that provision to sanctions would go far to ensure
that the courts' implementation of the provision would not detract from
an agency's willingness to relax regulations or to grant benefits.12
C. The "'Plain Meaning" Rule.
The principal thrust of the jurisdiction provision is to require
courts reviewing an agency action to seek a stronger foundation in leg-
islative intent than has previously been necessary. But, on the surface
at least, the provision does more. It appears to evince a definite prefer-
ence concerning the means by which the legislature's intent should be
ascertained-authorizing the court to consult legislative history and
other indicia of Congressional intent only "in the event of ambiguity"
(G) taking other compulsory or restrictive action; ....
5 U.S.C. § 551(10) (1976).
120. The full definition of "relief' is.
the whole or part of an agency-
(A) grant of money, assistance, license, authority, exemption, exception, privilege, or
remedy,
(B) recognition of a claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption, or exception; or
(C) taking of other action on the application or petition of, and beneficial to, 'a
person; ....
Id § 551(11) (1976).
121. Almost the only section of the APA that treats sanctions differently from relief is section
558(b), which declares: "A sanction may not be imposed.. . except within jurisdiction delegated
to the agency and as authorized by law." Id § 558(b). If Congress makes the change in section
706(c) suggested in the text, it should consider amending section 558(b) to contain language dupli-
cating the jurisdiction provision of the amendment. One 6f the most curious characteristics of the
Bumpers proposal is that it aims to "send a message" to the agencies by altering the review stan-
dards used by the courts. Presumably the sponsors anticipate that administrators will take the hint
after enough reversals, but if the command is to be issued, would it not be more logical to insert it
in a part of the APA that is addressed to agencies themselves? Just as "it is implausible to think
that the drafters of the APA would place a scope of review standard in the middle of a statutory
provision [section 556(d)] designed to govern evidentiary issues in adjudicatory proceedings,"
Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 100 n.20 (1981), it is odd for Congress to rely on an alteration in
the scope of review section to convey a message that is surely intended as much for agencies as for
the courts.
122. Jurisdictional rulings underlying a grant of relief would, of course, have to pass muster
under the second sentence of section 706(c). Admittedly, some agency actions will be difficult to
classify. For example, what a polluter calls relief may be a sanction in the eyes of environmental-
ists. . L. Tsm, supra note 67, at 288 n.14 (in the face of competing claims of right, a "clear
statement" approach to construction simply does not work). Nevertheless, the term "sanction"
appears to come much closer to the meaning intended by the drafters than does the present lan-
guage of section 706(c).
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in the statutory language. So interpreted, the amendment would
amount to a partial codification of the so-called "plain meaning" rule
of statutory construction.
Read in this manner, the amendment takes an extreme position in
a longstanding and unresolved argument over the proper relationship
between the language of a statute and extrinsic aids to construction.
The Supreme Court usually rejects the "plain meaning" rule, and has
often declared: "'When aid to construction of the meaning of words,
as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no "rule of
law" which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on
"superficial examination." "123 To be sure, the Burger Court has in
some recent cases taken a less permissive rhetorical position, stressing
that the plain meaning of a statute should be dispositive except in "rare
and exceptional circumstances." 124 Yet, even in the latter cases, the
Court has not taken as uncompromising a position as the Bumpers
Amendment seems to take; the Court has not intimated that a judge
may not even look at legislative history if the meaning of the text ap-
pears to be unambiguous.
Congress should not embrace the plain meaning dogma. Since
courts do ordinarily accept and consider legislative history that is ten-
dered to them, they should not have to go through the motions of pur-
porting to find a surface "ambiguity" in a statute, so that they will then
have the "right" to examine extrinsic evidence of meaning. The only
result of such ritualism would be a less than straightforward account of
what decisional factors the court deemed important. Moreover, if a
court actually did refuse to examine legislative history because the
terms of the statute seemed clear, it would risk frustrating the legisla-
ture's will. As the history of the Bumpers Amendment itself illustrates,
the processes of negotiation and compromise in legislative drafting oc-
casionally cause Congress to say one thing ("unambiguously") when it
123. E.g., Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205, 222 n.20 (1981); Train v. Colorado
PIRG, 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976); Cass v. United States, 417 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1974); see also Watt v.
Alaska. 451 U.S. 259 (1981); Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 157 (1972). On this
point the Court in Colorado PIAG cited Murphy, Old Maxims Never Di. The "Plain Meaing"
Rule and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern"Federal Courts, 75 CoLuM. L. Rnv. 1299 (1975),
a very effective defense of the Court's stance. 426 U.S. at 10. See also Wald, Some Observations on
the Use of Legislative Htory in the 1981 Supreme Court Tenm, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 196-99
(1983).
124. Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424 (1981); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 n.29 (1978);
ef United Airlines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 199 (1977). All three of these opinions were
written by Chief Justice Burger, who might thus be regarded as a leader in "plain meaning"
analysis. But the Chief Justice does not shrink from criticizing such analysis when it is used to
support results to which he is opposed. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 11 (1980) (Powell, J.,
joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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means another. 125 Codification of the plain meaning rule would ignore
the flexibility that courts must have in order to deal with these admit-
tedly unusual situations. I
The notion that the amendment will codify the plain meaning rule
may, however, be too alarmist. When the possbility of such a result
was called to the legislative committees' attention in 1981, they re-
sponded by minimizing the significance of the phrase "in the event of
ambiguity." 1 These disclaimers are fairly credible, because adoption
of a plain meaning approach would not necessarily promote the under-
lying purpose of the amendment--to curb the power of administrative
agencies. Sometimes the plain meaning approach would frustrate that
purpose: the courts often use extrinsic evidence of legislative intent to
overcome a literalist but expansive statutory interpretation favored by
an agency. 127 In all likelihood, the drafters of the amendment had no
particular views about the relative reliability of statutory language ver-
sus legislative history. They probably inserted the words "in the event
of ambiguity" simply because they thought they were reaffirming a
generally accepted principle of construction.1 28
Probably, then, the soundest reading of the amendment is that it is
not intended to prohibit the courts from consulting the legislative his-
tory or other extrinsic sources whenever they see fit to do so. 129 If that
is true, however, why include the distracting phrase "in the event of
ambiguity" at all? The legislative history contains absolutely no efforts
125. See 4Wra notes 27, 107-18 and accompanying text. See also Cass v. United States, 417
U.S. 72, 83 (1974) ("'In resolving ambiguity, we must allow ourselves some recognition of the
existence of sheer inadvertence in the legislative process.' ").
126. Where Congress anticipated the issue and squarely dealt with it in the language of
the statute, or when an agency has egregiously ;cted beyond its delegated power as
clearly delineated in the language of the statute, the court need not go beyond that lan-
guage to resolve the issue. Given the general nature of most statutory grants of authority
delegated by Congress, however, the Committee expects that the occasions in which
courts will encounter totally unambiguous statutory language will be rare. Ifa colorable
challenge to an agency's power to act in a certain area can be mounted, it is unlikely that
the limits of that power will be clearly apparent from the face of the statutory language.
Rather, such challenges will frequently require courts to go beyond the language of the
statute to discern congressional intent.
1982 HousE REPoRT,. xfra note 3, at 76; 1981 SENATE Gov'T AFFAIRS REPORT, Mspra note 32, at
90-91. The Senate Judiciary Committee met the issue less forcefully, but still reflected a not in-
hospitable attitude toward the use of legislative history. See 1981 SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT,
supra note 32, at 168-69.
127. See, eg., United Housing Fed'n, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848-51 (1975); NLRB v.
Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 71-72 (1964); Trustees of Indiana Univ. v.
United States, 618 F.2d 736, 739 (Ct. CL 1980).
128. See supra note 53 (congressional professions of adherence to traditional canons of
construction).
129. See 1981 House HEAsNos, supra note 30, at 935, in which a panel of distinguished
jurists-Judges McGowan, Ainsworth, Breyer, and Arnold-indicated that they regarded the
amendment as quite innocuous in this respect.
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by anyone to justify its presence.1 30 Economy of draftsmanship, if
nothing else, argues in favor of deletion.
IV. CONCLUSION
This comment has analyzed the jurisdiction provision on the basis
of materials prepared by the congressional sponsors of the Bumpers
Amendment. Although it is trite to remark that a reform proposal can-
not be satisfactorily evaluated until the courts have interpreted it, in
this instance the cliche applies with special force. After all, the amend-
ment imposes no tangible responsibilities on anyone and deals only
with ethereal issues of "mood."13' When and if the courts confront the
jurisdiction provision, they may ignore it entirely. Or they may con-
clude, as some passages of the legislative history suggest,' 32 that the
provision is merely an innocuous admonition urging them to act con-
scientiously and to construe regulatory legislation according to their
own best judgment. Or they may treat the jurisdiction provision as a
principle of narrow construction, whereby a court must seek clear indi-
cations from Congress that the agency is correct and must ignore the
persuasive force it would otherwise attribute to the agency's viewpoint.
This comment has maintained that the last of these alternatives is
probably a fair account of the intended meaning of the jurisdiction pro-
130. The committes' observation that a statutes language is sometimes entirely convincing
standing alone, see supra note 126, does not show how the statute would operate any differently if
the phrase "in the event of ambiguity" were omitted.
131. Proponents of the amendment often allude to Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), as an example of the kind of signal they hope the
courts will receive. See, eg., 1981 SENATE GOV'T AFFAIRS REPORT, supra note 32, at 92; Proceed-
ings, supra note 11, at 200 (remarks of Stephen Breyer). Frankfurter noted that the substantial
evidence test of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976), embodied a congressional "mood". 340
U.S. at 487. Since this mood was expressed "not merely by oratory but by legislation," id, it had
to be taken seriously; therefore, "courts must now assume more responsibility for the reasonable-
ness and fairness of [agency] decisions than some courts have shown in the past." Id at 490.
The analogy to Universal Camera may be telling in a way that the proponents did not antici-
pate. Universal Camera actually had three holdings. The first was that the substantiality of the
evidence must be determined by reference to the "whole record," not just the evidence supporting
the government's case. Id at 487-88. The second was the "mood" holding quoted above. The
third was that the hearing examiner's report should be given "such probative force as it intrinsi-
cally commands." Id at 493-97. The first and third holdings, which provide reasonably coherent
guidance to a reviewing court, have certainly been influential in the case law. But it is not at all
clear that the nebulous second holding effected any strengthening ofjudicial review. On the con-
trary, reviewing courts of the fifties are generally considered to have been exceptionally deferen-
tial towards administrative agencies. Not until the middle or late sixties, or perhaps the early
seventies, did a period of real judicial skepticism toward agencies set in-obviously not as a result
of Congress' prodding by "mood" in the APA. See, ag., Shapiro, On Preicting the Future of
Administratve Law, Rno., May-June 1982, at 18, 20. The 'mood" message of the Bumpers
Amendment may turn out to be equally futile.
132. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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vision, but that this reading raises several troubling concerns. Because
it speaks indiscriminately to virtually the entire spectrum of federal ad-
ministrative agencies, the provision gives the courts no genuine policy
direction. This across-the-board coverage reflects a failure of congres-
sional leadership. It also creates a sizeable risk that, if the courts do
apply the provision vigorously, they will invalidate worthwhile initia-
tives along with ill-advised ones. In addition, the jurisdiction provision
contains some particularly imprecise, awkward language that may fos-
ter confusion and unforeseen holdings.
Of course, the amendment may never be enacted, and these diffi-
culties never faced. Even if that proves true, however, the story of the
jurisdiction provision's journey through Congress may be of continuing
interest.133 It is a lesson in what is likely to emerge when a scope-of-
review statute is proposed as part of a regulatory reform movement
whose "impetus. . . is less distinctively legal, and more commercial or
economic," than the movement giving rise to the original APA almost
four decades ago.134 The objective of the jurisdiction provision--to a
greater extent, it would seem, than the other parts of the Bumpers
Amendment-is more to promote "deregulation" than to enact endur-
ing notions of fairness concerning the court-agency relationship. It
should be no surprise, therefore, if administrative lawyers detect defi-
133. Portions of this article's critique of the jurisdiction provision may have a bearing on an
analogous provision in Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(Supp. 1982), the blueprint for President Reagan's regulatory oversight program. According to the
Order, each executive branch agency issuing a "major" rule must "make a determination that the
regulation is clearly within the authority delegated by law and consistent with congressional in-
tent." Id § 4(a) (emphasis added). The natural reading of this provision would seem to be that if
an agency head believes he probably has authority to issue a given rule, but that he does not
clearly have it, he cannot proceed to adopt the rule without disobeying the President's directive.
The administrative history of section 4(a) suggests that the White House may not have intended
this implication, or at least may not view it as an important component of the oversight program.
See Shane, PresidentialRegutaory Oversight and the Separation ofPowerr: 7he Constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 12,291,23 ARiz. L. REv. 1235, 1239 n.24 (1981). If the Administration does
decide to treat the word "clearly" as a significant restriction, some of this article's doubts about the
wisdom of so broad-ranging a condemnation of marginally authorized agency action would be
pertinent. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text. (I would not, however, go as far as
Learned Hand, who once suggested that enforcing agencies have a positive duty to test the outer
limits of their authority. See Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 154 F.2d 785 (2d
Cir.), aj'd, 328 U.S. 275 (1946).) This construction by the White House, as yet only hypothetical,
would also raise an intriguing separation-of-powers question: if the President abrogates executive
agencies' power to act in subject areas in which their authority to act is uncertain, has he frustrated
Congress' intent to confer policymaking discretion on those agencies? The symposium in which
Shane's article appears is a stimulating guide to the general problem. See Symposium, Cost.BenVfit
Analysui and Agency Decision-Making: An Analyis of Executive Order No. 12,291, 23 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1195 (1981).
134. Scalia, Chairman Message, 33 AD. L. REV. , ix (Fall 1981).
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ciencies in the final product. 35 A statute that prescribes the scope of
judicial review for an entire government's activities is not a suitable
battleground for a campaign against "overregulation."
135. Professor (now Judge) Scalia reaches a similar conclusion concerning the recent regula-
tory reform drive as a whole. See id atx. A more optimistic opinion about the utility of scope-of-
review legislation is offered in Brodie & Linde, State Court Review ofAdmiristraiveAction" Pre-
scribing the Scope of Review, 1977 ARiz. ST. LJ. 537, 538. Their assessment, however, is largely
based on scrutiny of state-level administrative procedure acts, which have been low-visibility
measures promoted mainly by lawyers.
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